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Social skills refer to a wide group of abilities that allow us to interact and communicate
with others. Children learn how to solve social situations by predicting and understanding
other’s behaviors. The way in which humans learn to interact successfully with others
encompasses a complex interaction between neural, behavioral, and environmental
elements. These have a role in the accomplishment of positive developmental outcomes,
including peer acceptance, academic achievement, and mental health. All these social
abilities depend on widespread brain networks that are recently being studied by
neuroscience. In this paper, we will first review the studies on this topic, aiming to clarify
the behavioral and neural mechanisms related to the acquisition of social skills during
infancy and their appearance in time. Second, we will briefly describe how developmental
diseases like Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) can inform about the neurobiological
mechanisms of social skills. We finally sketch a general framework for the elaboration of
cognitive models in order to facilitate the comprehension of human social development.
Keywords: social skills, social cognition, development, childhood, Autism Spectrum Disorders, EEG, fMRI, social
brain
Introduction
Social cognition involves all the abilities that enable us to understand social agents and to interact
with them. In this process, it is crucial to be able to predict the behavior of others, by detecting,
analyzing, and interpreting their intentions. In this paper, we adopt a developmental perspective
to clarify how social understanding evolves (Rao et al., 2008; Alaerts et al., 2011). For instance,
during social development it is possible to observe social behavior precursors, which are necessary
abilities for developing the capacity to deal with more complex social information (i.e., to deal
with a group of people). Social skills, such as the detection of biology motion and sensitivity to
eye-like stimulus, can be understood as precursors, not only because they appear first in human
life but also because they are required for the acquisition of further social abilities, like face
recognition or joint attention (Charman et al., 2001; Happé and Frith, 2014). Thus, these social
precursors form a temporal sequence of events that may be needed to give rise to appropriate
social behavior. Indeed, prior work has shown that the development of social skills encompasses a
complex and delicate interaction between several elements, such as smiling, eye contact, imitation,
joint attention, language, and the observer’s own motor system among others. These elements
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play a role in the accomplishment of positive developmental
outcomes, including peer acceptance, academic achievement, and
mental health (Rao et al., 2008). Although this temporal sequence
encompasses changes that can be observed at both neural and
behavioral levels, the literature about social development has
drawn up different concepts over the years. These concepts
have been elaborated to construct cognitive models of social
functioning that can explain the connection between behavior
and brain mechanisms (Johnson, 2011). Even though in the
literature the social cognition concept is commonly used as a
good fit for this connection, an overview of social phenomena
includes several concepts that interact and overlap each other,
such as the social brain, social cognition, social behavior, and
social functioning (Baars and Gage, 2012; Billeke et al., 2013a).
We summarize some of the key concepts in Table 1.
Following the main contributions in this area, we will describe
the most important evidence for the development of social skills
at three levels, namely neuronal, cognitive, and behaviorally.
While the neuronal and behavioral levels are an aspects that
can be directly observed and measured, the cognitive one
considers different models about how neuronal mechanisms lead
to behavior (i.e., the way in which the brain is associated with
behavior). Thus, we will organize this review in three sections.
We will first make a timeline of the behavioral events that may be
related to social development. Then we will draw a chronology
of the appearance of neural and cerebral events that have been
linked to these social behaviors. Second, we briefly review how
conditions that involve primary social impairments, like Autism
Spectrum Disorders (ASD), can inform about both the trajectory
of social development and the neurobiological mechanisms
related to the social behavior. Finally, we will sketch a general
framework for the elaboration of cognitive models in order to
facilitate the comprehension of human social development.
Development of Social Behavior
Consistent evidence has reported that the abilities associated with
visual processing are crucial for the development of social skills
(Emery, 2000; Happé and Frith, 2014). These studies have shown
that capacities such as eye-like sensitivity, biological motion
preference, imitation, face recognition, and gaze following are
present from the very beginning of human life (Courchesne et al.,
1981; Emery, 2000; Webb and Nelson, 2001; Itier, 2004; Dalton
et al., 2005; Csibra et al., 2008; Hoehl et al., 2008; Baars and Gage,
2010; Billeke and Aboitiz, 2013; Happé and Frith, 2014; Peña
et al., 2014; Von dem Hagen et al., 2014). These abilities could
be understood as the first signs of social capacities, which later
should deal with more complex stimulus and social interactions
(i.e., to discriminate among familiar and unfamiliar faces, to
initiate joint attention, etc.).
Social Agent Detection: Early Eye-like Sensitivity,
Imitation, and Biological Motion Preference
From a very early age, human and non-human primates show a
set of visual behaviors that seem to influence social development.
Specifically, preference for focusing on eyes (eye-like sensitivity)
and eye-like stimuli have been widely described in the literature
as having a crucial function for social development. Studies in
non-human primates have shown that head and eye orientation
can provide crucial signals to the understanding of the social
world (Emery, 2000). Coincidently with this, a recent study in
human infants showed that typically developing (TD) children
from 2 to 6 months of age look more into the eyes than at
mouth and body (Jones andKlin, 2013). This research also reveals
that eye fixation increases from 2 to 24 months of age, showing
that human social engagement may be related to the this visual
capacity already present in such early age.
The eye-like sensitivity also provides the possibility to learn
from others, which is an essential task of the developing
social brain (Gariépy et al., 2014; Happé and Frith, 2014). A
landmark study revealed that 12 days old infants have a mimicry
behavior (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977). This imitation behavior
occurred for the four gestures that were assessed, namely lip
protrusion, mouth opening, tongue protrusion and sequential
finger movement performances by an unfamiliar experimenter.
The fact that infants imitate not one, but four different gestures,
support the interpretation that basic imitationmight be an innate
ability. In accordance to this, ethological studies have revealed
that early imitation is also present in non-human primates
(Ferrari et al., 2006; Paukner et al., 2011). A study with infant
macaques showed that the imitative responses are already present
since the first day of life, when infant macaques are able to imitate
lip smacking, elicited by a model’s mouth opening, and tongue
protrusion, showing a phylogenetic aspect of human behavior
(García et al., 2014). Interestingly, the neonatal imitation of the
lip smackingmay sub-serve for infants’ affiliative responses to the
social world, because this behavior is a core gesture in face-to-face
interaction in macaques (García et al., 2014).
The detection of social agents, however, depends not only
on eye-like sensitivity and gaze following, but also relies on
another crucial visual ability, namely, the biological motion
discrimination. Biological motion refers to the remarkable
capacity to discriminate and recognize biological motion patterns
as a set of moving dots on the main joints of an invisible
walker. Actually, several findings have revealed that despite
the perceptual ambiguity that this experimental stimulus may
involve, humans readily extract the invariant structure from
biological motion (Pavlova and Sokolov, 2000). The mechanisms
through which humans can interpret the complex sequences of
action of other humans has been a topic of interest to researchers
for decades (Johnson, 2006). Since the landmark study by
Johansson (1973), several studies have shown that human beings
are able to identify body motion directions as well as to
discriminate different kinds of limb motion patterns (Johansson,
1973; Bertenthal et al., 1984; Pavlova and Sokolov, 2000; Simion
et al., 2008). Similarly to eye-like sensitivity, biological motion
preference might be also an early ability, because newborn
human beings are able to discriminate biological motion from
non-biological motion (Simion et al., 2008). Newborns aged 1–
3 days were able to discriminate between a biological motion
animation (i.e., moving array of point-lights attached to the joints
of an individual during a walk) and a non-biological motion
animation sequence (i.e., the random motion), which is reflected
in the longer fixation time to these stimuli (Simion et al., 2008).
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TABLE 1 | Social concepts.
Concept Definition Level involved
Neural Cognitive Behavioral
Social brain Brain network whose function is associated with social processing. It could be described as
structures operating in a network that could enable an accurately social performance
Social cognition All kind of cognitive processes that can allow us to interact with others and to understand other
people’s intentions, feelings, emotions, and behaviors
Social behavior The ability to interact with others
Social skills A wide group of abilities that emerges from the appropriate execution of social cognition
processing. This adequate performance allows us to interact and communicate with others, by
predicting and understanding other people’s intentions, feelings, emotions, and behaviors
Social functioning Social behavior when it is integrated over time and context
Social precursors A group of very early onset abilities readily observable in newborns or early infancy such as
eye-like sensitivity, biological motion preference, and imitation
Colors represent the different levels of description that involved each concept. Green indicates neural level, gray cognitive level and orange behavioral level.
Indeed, their findings also revealed that this biological motion
preference is also orientation-dependent, because newborns
looked longer at upright arrays than at inverted biological
motion displays. Interestingly, other study found that infants
of 3 and 5 months present these preferences only for moving
displays and not with the static arrays (Bertenthal et al., 1984).
Furthermore, this effect was not found to interact with the age
of the infants or the upright or inverted form. Recently, it has
been shown that infants, as young as 12 months old, can follow
the direction of point-light moving array with the gaze (Furuhata
and Shirai, 2015). This reveals a continuous development and
specialization of the ability to discriminate biological motion,
probably influenced by experience of environmental exposition.
Toward a Shared World: Gaze Following Ability
and Face Recognition Processing
Following the idea that social development is a set of
concatenated elements, it should be noted that the eye-like
sensitivity seems to precede the posterior ability of gaze
following. A recent study in full-term and preterm infants
showed that visual experience has a significant influence on
the development of early gaze following (Peña et al., 2014). By
using eye tracking, they found that gaze following in preterm
infants was similar to that of full-term infants with the same
chronological age, despite their difference in postmenstrual
age. This fact highlights the importance of the environmental
stimulation for the development of this ability. The undeniable
participation of the environment is also present in non-human
primates. Shepherd et al. (2006) demonstrated that in low-
status male rhesus macaques, the gaze following was a reflexive
process, while in high-status macaques the gaze was a voluntary
mechanism. By using a simple visual orienting task paradigm,
they showed that in low-status macaques the reaction time for
saccades made to a peripheral target after viewing an image of
a familiar monkey in that direction was faster than in high-
status subjects. Even more, high-status macaques showed a
complete lack of inhibition of return of the saccade. According
to the authors, these findings reveal that faster gaze following
and later inhibition of return in low-status monkeys involves a
reflexive attention, whereas in high-status monkeys lower gaze
following and absence of inhibition of return implies a voluntary
component of attention.
As we discussed above, it is important to consider that eye-
like sensitivity and gaze following are related to another crucial
ability, namely face recognition. Several studies have shown that
the ability to recognize faces specializes over time (Johnson,
2011; di Giorgio et al., 2012; Zieber et al., 2013; Macchi Cassia
et al., 2014). Kelly et al. (2005) proved that newborn infants
did not show any spontaneous preference for faces from either
their own- or other-ethnic groups, however, 3-month-old infants
did show a clear preference for faces from their own-ethnic
group. Thus, the influence of the environmental experience
during the first 3 months of postnatal life is plenty enough for
inducing a visual preference for own-race faces. Turati et al.
(2005) demonstrated that infants of the same age display a
spontaneous visual preference for an upright image of a real face
over an upside-down version of the same face. Furthermore, the
distribution of looking times indicates that infants looked longer
toward the eye area of the face, although only in the case of the
upright face configuration (Turati et al., 2005; Jones and Klin,
2013). Thus, eyes are not strong enough cues to attract the gaze
of infants of this age, because their interest is modulated by the
context in which the eyes are located (Turati et al., 2005). In
addition, Quinn et al. (2002) tested the perception of gender
of human faces in 3- and 4-month-old infants and proved that
infants were able to discriminate among female and male faces.
They familiarized one group of infants with female faces and
another group of infants with male faces in order to assess the
ability to discriminate a member within a given category (male or
female). Their results showed that the group that was familiarized
with female faces exhibited a preference for a novel female face,
while the group of infants that were familiarized with male faces
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revealed a preference for a novel male face (Quinn et al., 2002).
Taken together, these findings suggest that the age of 3 months
may represent a milestone for face processing, revealing that
the first signs of cognitive specialization for faces are present
around this age (Kelly et al., 2005; Turati et al., 2005; Johnson,
2011; di Giorgio et al., 2012; Zieber et al., 2013; Macchi Cassia
et al., 2014). In this context, the relative weight of the genetic
and environmental influences over this process remain unclear
(Turati et al., 2005).
Reaching the Understanding of Others: Joint
Attention, Social Perspective-taking, and Theory
of Mind
Even though the evidence reveals that apes can understand
the expression of signs like posture, vocalization, and facial
expression and are able to take action based on those signs,
the capacity to understand the subjectivity of another member
of their own species is an ability highly developed in humans
(Baars and Gage, 2010). Considering the evidence reviewed in
the previous section, it can be argued that the development
in humans of the ability to detect social agents relies on the
development of gaze abilities. Moreover, following the temporal
sequence of social behaviors it is possible to state that, at the
beginning, early preference to look at faces in mutual gaze
(Farroni et al., 2002) is revealing a preference to a social situation
where the visual attention of two individuals is directed at each
other (Emery, 2000). Secondly, this basic level of complexity
evolves to a complex level where the earlier capacity of gaze
following (Farroni et al., 2002; Hoehl et al., 2008; Jones and
Klin, 2013) allows children to develop the ability to identify that
the glance of their partner is focusing away from them and,
thus, direct their own attention toward the partner’s focus of
attention. This time sequence could end in the development
of an even more complex ability which now includes a third
element, namely joint attention. Interestingly, earlier levels of
social development such as mutual gaze and gaze following,
include a dyadic social relationship, but joint attention ability
implies a triadic communication. Joint attention (JA) ability is
defined as the capacity to share the perception of a common
object with another person (Mundy et al., 2000; Charman et al.,
2001; Charman, 2003; Morgan et al., 2003; Striano et al., 2006;
Lachat et al., 2012; Hopkins and Taglialatela, 2013). A key
component of JA is the division and the alternation of the
subject’s attention between the object and the partner (Bakeman
and Adamson, 1984; Charman, 2003; Striano et al., 2006). The
two most common behaviors of JA are pointing to designate
interest in an object and alternating eye gaze to check that both
the child and the partner are attending to the same event (Morgan
et al., 2003). Several studies agree that JA emerges around the age
of 9 months (Morgan et al., 2003; Striano et al., 2006; Kopp and
Lindenberger, 2011), when children learn to use eye contact to
derive information about another person’s goal-directed behavior
(Morgan et al., 2003). Joint attention ability can be dissociated
in mainly two types of behavior: responding JA and initiating JA
(Mundy et al., 2000, 2009; Mundy and Jarrold, 2010). The first
one refers to the case where the child responds to gestures that
a communicative partner produces (Mundy et al., 2000; Hopkins
and Taglialatela, 2013). The second one refers to the case where
the child spontaneously points, shows, and uses eye contact to
share the experience of an object (Mundy et al., 2000). The
initiation of JA behaviors seems to appear later in development
than the capacity to respond to JA (Hopkins and Taglialatela,
2013).
Another social skill that contributes to the development
of social knowledge is the social perspective-taking, which
according to Moll and Kadipasaoglu (2013) emerges after the
development of joint attention. It is important to notice that this
new social ability has to deal with the problem of generating
more accurate expectations or predictions about the other’s
behaviors (Koster-Hale and Saxe, 2013; Billeke et al., 2015). The
social perspective-taking refers to some level of comprehension
of other’s purposes, objectives and preferences. Actually, it is
possible to suggest that around 24months of age infants appear to
be able to identify other’s references and perspectives. At this age,
children can capture previous expressions of other’s preference in
order to contrast new experience with this previous experiential
background. In this way, infants can identify the difference and
interpret others’ intentions or preferences. This background is
made up by what the child and his communicational partner did,
witnessed, or heard. Thus, this experiential background provides
a template that allows establishing a social reference and finally
a social perspective-taking. This ability has been evidenced by
means of tasks that measure implicit mentalization (Southgate
et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007; Baillargeon et al., 2010), for
example, the object detection task, which is a variant of the
standard false belief task (Kovács et al., 2010). This experimental
design generally uses an agent who is looking for an object
of interest that was left in a place which both, the infant and
the agent know, or that only the infant knows. For instance,
an interesting study carried out by Surian et al. (2007) showed
that 13-month-old infants looked longer to a non-familiarized
stimulus only if it is in the agent’s visual field. This finding reveals
that infants take into account the agent’s visual perspective to
generate different expectations about the agent’s future actions.
Coincidently, a recent study demonstrates that at this age, infants
are able to understand other people’s interactions, revealing a
preverbal theory of mind ability (Choi and Luo, 2015). This
study assessed the responses to a false belief paradigm, showing
that infants looked reliably longer to the scene where a puppet
reacted in a positive manner to the agent that had previously hit
another puppet. These results evidence that infants might keep
some sort of record of past negative interactions and are able
to associate them with the identity of the person having shown
aggressiveness. Thus, the support for the infant’s perspective
comes from the data on false belief of the puppet who does not
know that the now friendly puppet was previously rude.
The above evidence indicates that the infant’s gaze can
be a useful experimental tool to assess the ability to predict
other people’s behavior in preverbal children. In fact, Southgate
et al. (2007) showed that a predictive looking paradigm allows
measuring the child’s expectation of where the agent will be
going to look for his/her goal-object. In their study, the authors
interestingly found that 25-month-old infants remained attentive
to the area where the agent is expected to look for if he/she had
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a false belief. Therefore, the standard false believe test suggests
that the ability to understand or at least to perceive the belief
states of other individuals is present at ages earlier than 4
years.
However, the explicit skill to identify other people’s false
beliefs becomes evident only in 4-year-old children (Perner and
Roessler, 2012). Premack and Woodruff (1978) presented theory
of mind as a social skill that refers the ability that allows the
individual to be able to assign mental states to himself/herself or
to others, such as purpose, intention, knowledge, belief, thinking,
doubt, guessing, pretending, feeling, etc. According to the time
sequence of social behavior described here, several studies suggest
that a precursor of this theory of mind mechanism could be the
ability of joint attention (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Charman
et al., 2001) and social perspective-taking. In fact, Moll and
Kadipasaoglu (2013) state that social perspective-tacking emerges
between the development of joint attention and theory of mind.
The theory of mind ability can be considered as a stage of
cognitive development that reflects the child’s understanding that
minds are not just copies of reality, but representations that
could be true or false (Tager-Flusberg, 1999). In this regard,
the evidence that comes from the false belief task is a robust
indication that this is a major landmark in social development
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985;Wellman et al., 2001). The mechanism
by which the switch to an explicit verbalization to other people’s
perspective occurs is still debated. Some authors argue that
the development of cognitive abilities related to language and
response inhibition are reflected in the explicit theory of mind
(Baillargeon et al., 2010). By contrast, the correlation between
explicit perspective taking test and classical false belief task can
be used to claim that the explicit theory of mind reflect an
intentional switch of perspective that it is not possible before 4
years of age (Perner and Roessler, 2012).
Considering the evidence reviewed, Figure 1 summarizes
the behavioral chronology of the main milestones of social
development during the first 4 years of age. At the beginning,
the feature attributions to social agents are constrained by
the rudimentary specialization of the sensory abilities such as
biological motion and eye detection, face recognition, and gaze
following. At some point at 3 months of age, the social cognitive
system is starting to open up toward the incorporation of the
other’s attention in a rudimentary interaction. This process may
be associated to a neural specialization which the environmental
influence has a critical role (see below). At 9 months of age,
infants begin to respond to social agent attention and months
later, to initiate intentional social interchanges. At 13 months of
age, evidence has shown that social attributions begin to be more
refined, allowing the child to include other’s perspectives, such
as preferences, perspectives, intentions, and beliefs, showing the
first signs of the ability to make predictions about other people’s
behavior. Finally, this development becomes more specialized
and enables children to predict other’s actions and to explicitly
express those predictions.
Even though this behavioral evidence has been very
informative, there is another valuable area of data that could be
useful to elucidate the trajectory of human social development.
In order to shed light on the mechanisms that are the basis of
human social functioning, we will discuss the findings of the
neural processes that underlie social behavior.
Neural Correlates of the Development of
Social Skills
Although the development of social behavior is also influenced
by a wide variety of hormones, such as oxytocin and vasopressin
and steroid hormones like testosterone (for a complete review
see McCall and Singer, 2012), the analysis of these factors are
beyond the scope of this review. We will focus on cerebral
networks that have been associated with social functioning
(Wang, 2010; Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012; Billeke and Aboitiz,
2013), especially on evidence emerging from studies conducted
with electroencephalography and brain imaging techniques
(Wang, 2010).
Electroencephalographic Evidence of the
Development of Social Skills
Electroencephalography (EEG) is a technique widely used in
human neuroscience because it is a non-invasive technique that
FIGURE 1 | Social behavior timeline. Chronology of major social behavior milestones during childhood. Blue indicates evidence related to sensory system
maturation and red indicates findings related to motor system maturation. In gray are represented possible feature attributions to social agents.
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allows direct measurements of electrical brain activity from scalp
electrodes (DeBoer et al., 2007; Billeci et al., 2013). Especially
with infants and children, the EEG is useful tool because it
can be informative in absence of an observable behavior, which
is often the case with infants (DeBoer et al., 2007). However,
the EEG analysis in infants and children is full of difficulties
and limitations, due to processes such as myelination, synaptic
elimination, increase in skull thickness and fontanel closing,
which can influence both amplitude and latency of the event-
related potential (ERPs) across different ages (DeBoer et al.,
2007). The computational analysis of the EEG signal provides two
types of neural activity. The first one is the response evoked by
a stimulus or event, namely event-related potential (ERP). ERPs
are obtained from the average of several trials with the purpose
of eliminating the interference of signals related to the stimulus
of interest. Therefore, this methodology analyses brain wave
forms that are phase-locked to the stimulus presentation. The
second one is the analysis of oscillatory brain activity that is not
necessarily phase-locked to the stimulus presentation (Tallon-
Baudry and Bertrand, 1999). Indeed, by mean of the study of
oscillatory brain activity it is possible to study the brain activity
not related to a specific task, namely the study of spontaneous
brain activity.
Contribution of Early ERP Components to the Study
of the Development of Social Skills
The early ERP components usually occur during the first 200ms
after stimuli presentation (McCulloch, 2007), and can serve
as markers to follow the functional development of neuronal
activity. For example, the early visual component P1 can be used
to understand the visual processes involved in the abilities related
to social functioning. The P1 component is a positive deflection
that arises between 90 and 150ms after a visual stimulus (Luyster
et al., 2014) and is generated in the occipital visual cortex. This
component is present in individuals of all ages (Haan et al.,
2002), showing modulation by spatial information (Hopf and
Mangun, 2000) and low sensitivity to stimulus familiarity (de
Haan and Nelson, 1999). In infants and young children, there
is an increase in P1 amplitude with age (Luyster et al., 2014).
However, sometime between the ages of 4 and 6 years, this
pattern is reversed, and the amplitude of the P1 starts to decrease
with age (Kuefner et al., 2010), likely reflecting the process of
synaptic pruning (Luyster et al., 2014). In accordance with this
evidence, the P1 elicited by human faces shows a decrease in
its amplitude and latency between the 9 and 17 years of age
(Hileman et al., 2011). In fact, typically developing children and
young adolescents showed larger P1 amplitudes for inverted faces
compared to upright faces (Hileman et al., 2011). Interestingly, in
this study the smaller P1 amplitudes were correlated with fewer
atypical social behaviors and better social cognitive skills.
Another important ERP component that has been linked
with social development is the N170. The N170 component
is a negative deflection that peaks between 140 and 170ms
over posterior temporal sites, being elicited by human faces
(Courchesne et al., 1981; de Haan and Nelson, 1997, 1999; de
Haan, 2002; Haan et al., 2002; Itier, 2004; Dawson et al., 2005;
Johnson et al., 2005; de Haan et al., 2007; Csibra et al., 2008;
Elsabbagh et al., 2009; Hileman et al., 2011). In adults, this
component is generated in the ventral visual pathway, likely
from the fusiform face area. This component shows a shorter
latency and larger amplitude for faces compared to other stimuli
(Haan et al., 2002; Hileman et al., 2011). As in the case of P1,
inverted faces elicit larger N170 amplitude than upright faces
(Hileman et al., 2011). Several studies have suggested that N170
in infants and children may have a precursor, namely, the N290
component (de Haan et al., 2007; Csibra et al., 2008; Luyster et al.,
2014). The infant N290 is a negative deflection that occurs over
posterior electrodes of the scalp between 3 and 12 months of
age (de Haan et al., 2007; Luyster et al., 2014). This component
shows a significant change with age. In a study with infants
between 6 and 36 months of age, researchers observed that
the N290 component decreases in average amplitude (Luyster
et al., 2014). This decrease may reflect the gradual change of
this component into N170. The term N290 can be confusing,
being called interchangeably the “N290” or a putative “infant
170,” which can be misleading. Nevertheless, Farroni et al. (2002)
claim that “putative infant N170” shares some characteristics
with the adult N170 component as it is the first negative
deflection after the P1 over posterior electrodes. Indeed, after
controlling for the impressive change of P1 through time, the
infant N170 has in common with the adult component both the
latency and the topography since the age of 4 years old (Kuefner
et al., 2010). This putative infant N170 component also shows
a functional specialization. This orientation effect of N170 (i.e.,
greater amplitude for inverted faces) becomes evident not before
of 6–12 month of age (Haan et al., 2002; Righi et al., 2014). Thus,
the developmental change of the N170 component may reveal
a cortical specialization during the first year of life (Haan et al.,
2002).
Another controversial infant ERP is the Pb component, which
it has been associated to social processing, such as JA and
emotion perception (Striano et al., 2006; Kopp and Lindenberger,
2011; Jessen and Grossmann, 2014). This component is a
positive deflection of early appearance in the frontal and central
electrodes which appears between 150 and 250ms (Striano et al.,
2006; Kopp and Lindenberger, 2011; Jessen and Grossmann,
2014). Indeed, the Pb component in infants could correspond
to the P2 component in older children and adults (Kopp
and Lindenberger, 2011). Pb shows a greater negativity in the
condition of JA compared to non-JA (Striano et al., 2006) and is
also modulated by face emotion (Jessen and Grossmann, 2014).
The Pb component has been interpreted as reflecting stimulus
expectancy or contextual processing (Striano et al., 2006; Kopp
and Lindenberger, 2011).
Contribution of Late ERP Components to the Study
of the Development of the Social Skills
The late ERP components are in general described as field
potentials that occur 200ms after the stimulus presentation
(Csibra et al., 2008). During childhood, one of the best known
late ERP components is the Nc component, which seems to be the
first endogenous ERP to emerge in development, being present at
birth (Nelson and McCleery, 2008). The Nc component reveals
a peak latency decreasing from 800ms in 1-month-olds (Karrer
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and Monti, 1995) to 400–600ms in 1- to 3-year-olds (Goldman
et al., 2004; Parker and Nelson, 2005). The peak amplitude of Nc
increases with age over the first year of life (Richards, 2003;Webb
et al., 2005; Luyster et al., 2014) and then decreases again in the
third year of life (Parker and Nelson, 2005; Luyster et al., 2014).
The Nc component is considered to reflect attentional orienting
to salient stimuli (Courchesne et al., 1981; Pelphrey et al., 2002;
Striano et al., 2006) and/or an attentional general activation
(arousal), suggesting that children increase their attention to
environmental stimuli that are more salient (Striano et al., 2006).
Since this component seems to reflect aspects of recognition
and familiarity (de Haan et al., 2007), it is elicited in a series
of different studies, including face processing. This evidence
agrees with the notion that the Nc component is associated to
a mandatory attentional processing to a visual stimulus, although
not specifically to faces (Luyster et al., 2014). However, the Nc has
shown a right-side lateralization, which is consistent with the role
of the right hemisphere in the processing of faces (Reynolds and
Richards, 2005; Webb et al., 2005; de Haan et al., 2007; Nelson
and McCleery, 2008; Luyster et al., 2014). In addition, the Nc
component has been widely associated the JA ability (Striano
et al., 2006; Kopp and Lindenberger, 2011). In fact, in 9 months
old infants, this component shows higher amplitude during JA
context than during non-JA contexts in fronto-central channels
(Striano et al., 2006; Kopp and Lindenberger, 2011). The neural
source of this component has been suggested to be the anterior
cingulate cortex (Reynolds and Richards, 2005). Interestingly, in
adults, this region together with the right fronto-parietal network
participates in the initiation of the joint attention (Caruana et al.,
2015).
Another late component observed in infants is the P400. This
component is a positive deflection predominantly over right
temporo-occipital electrodes, and is more prominent when the
stimulus presented a face (de Haan and Nelson, 1999; Haan
et al., 2002; Luyster et al., 2014). This component shows a pattern
of non-linear age related change, with steadily increasing mean
amplitudes between 6 and 24 months and decreasing amplitudes
between 24 and 36months of age (Luyster et al., 2014). Moreover,
in the de Haan et al. (2002) study, the infant P400 was observed
over occipital and temporal electrodes, elicited by both upright
and inverted human and monkey faces. Also, they found that
the P400 component showed larger amplitudes for upright than
inverted faces, regardless of species, although another study
showed the opposite pattern when using familiar faces (Balas
et al., 2010). As well as with early ERPs, the evidence of late
ERPs components has been suggested that they may be revealing
a cortical specialization of the brain during childhood. The
evidence reviewed here might be revealed that more voluntary or
at least mandatory processes, such as attention or memory, also
modulate late ERPs. Thus, neural specialization allows a more
efficient stimulus processing thanks to neural resources saving
and the capacity of control and redistribution of those resources.
Evidence of Oscillatory Brain Activity during the
Development of Social Skills
Oscillatory brain activity has been found to participate
significantly in social functioning. The oscillatory brain activity
is a recurrent brain activity measured in the dimension of
time (Klimesch, 2012), that can or cannot be phase-locked to a
stimulus presentation. The extracranial EEG signal reflects the
neuronal population activity which is commonly decomposed
into different frequency ranges namely delta (∼2–4Hz), theta
(∼4–8Hz), alpha (∼8–12Hz), beta (∼12–30Hz), and gamma
frequencies (∼30–100Hz; Donner and Siegel, 2011).
One of the most studied oscillatory activities in relation
to social skills is the mu rhythm. This rhythm occurs in the
alpha range between 8 and 12Hz, but unlike alpha rhythm,
which is prominent in the visual cortex, the mu rhythm occurs
in the somatic sensorimotor cortex (Oberman et al., 2005;
Raymaekers et al., 2009). The mu rhythm amplitude decreases
duringmovement execution and planning, and also during tactile
stimulation. Interestingly, mu suppression is also presented
during motor imitation and during the observation of other’s
goal directed movement. Based on this finding it has been
proposed that mu suppression can reflect a putative activity of
the mirror neuron system (Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2010). Mirror neurons were discovered by di
Pellegrino et al. (1992) in the monkey premotor cortex. They
found that neurons of the rostral part of inferior premotor cortex
of the monkey discharges during goal-directed hand movements,
such as grasping, holding, and tearing. Mirror neuron system
is a special kind of neurons that become active when the
monkey performs a particular action and when it observes
a similarly performed action by another monkey or human
(Gallese et al., 1996). In humans, most of the evidence comes
from fMRI or EEG techniques, and results may only be putatively
considered as evidence for mirror neuron activity (Buccino
et al., 2001; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Oberman et al.,
2005; Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006; Raymaekers et al., 2009). In
spite of this fact, Mukamel et al. (2010) recorded extracellular
activity from neurons of 21 patients with pharmacologically
intractable epilepsy while they was observing or performing a
grasping action or facial gestures. The authors found neurons
that responded to both, action-perception and action-execution
in two novel brain areas, namely medial frontal cortex and
medial temporal cortex (hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus,
and entorhinal cortex). Interestingly, they observed a subset
of this kind of cells that increased their firing rate when the
subject was in the action-execution condition, but decreased
their firing rate when the subject was in the action-perception
condition. It is possible to speculate that these neurons can
reflect the ability to recognize the differentiation between actions
performed by oneself or by someone else (Keysers and Gazzola,
2010).
Although the neural mechanism that connects mu
suppression with mirror neurons is still unknown, a plenty
of works in adults use this rhythm as a marker of neuron mirror
system activity. However, there is yet little evidence about a mu
rhythm in children. Lepage and Théoret (2006) obtained data
in children between the ages of 4 and 11 years, and found that
children showed a mu suppression during the observation of
grasping movements (Lepage and Théoret, 2006). Interestingly,
using a sample of children between the age of 6 and 17 years,
a study found a negative correlation between mu suppression
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elicited by observing other’s movement and the age of the
participants (Oberman et al., 2013). This correlation was not
found during the execution of the movement. This result reveals
a developmental trajectory of mirror neuron systems, possibly
related to the specialization of local circuits.
Imaging Evidence of the Development of Social
Skills
In addition to EEG, another technique to assess brain
development comes from magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
methods and functional MRI (fMRI). The latter imaging
technique reflects the changes in hemodynamic brain response
related to the neural activity (Auer, 2008) by means of the blood
oxygenation level-dependent signal (BOLD) (Ogawa et al., 1990).
fMRI has the advantage of a higher spatial resolution, although
a lower temporal accuracy related to EEG (de Bie et al., 2012).
In recent years, a non-negligible number of evidence has been
developed thanks to the use of MRI and fMRI methods to study
social skills. Unfortunately, due to technical and ethical issues,
fMRI is an intricate method to use with infants and children
(Johnson et al., 2005), especially under 4-years old (de Bie et al.,
2012).
The infant brain is involved in continuous changes as
revealed by several structural imaging studies (Mills et al.,
2012). Specifically to the social brain, Mills et al. (2012)
describe a developmental trajectory that encompasses several
developmental changes of its structures. By the analysis of
the structural MRI data of participants between 7 and 30
years old, this study revealed that the gray matter volume
and cortical thickness in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC),
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and posterior temporal sulcus
(pSTS) first increases reaching a maximum at about 10 years
(on average), and then declines until around age 20 (Mills et al.,
2012). These structures have been linked with both theory of
mind skills and the prediction of others’ behavior (Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe et al., 2009; Billeke et al., 2013b, 2014b,
2015). Furthermore, Mills et al. (2012) reported that the volume
of gray matter in the anterior temporal cortex increases until
adolescence and cortical thickness into young adulthood, which
has been also associated with the processing of mentalization
(Saxe andKanwisher, 2003), especially when the use of contextual
and prior social information is required (Olson et al., 2012).
These changes in brain development can reflect the cortical
specialization of the preexisting cerebral structures and networks
as a result of the expertise associated with exposure to social
environment (Johnson et al., 2005; Johnson, 2011; Davidson and
McEwen, 2012).
Regarding mirror neuron system activity, fMRI evidence
in adults has revealed that a large number of brain regions
are activated during the execution of an action as well as
when the same action is seen or heard (Buccino et al., 2001).
In children, the mirror neuron system has been linked with
mentalizing abilities such as imitating and observing emotional
expressions (Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006). In an fMRI study
with children around 10 and 14 years old, Dapretto et al.
(2006) observed that the brain regions that were activated
during the imitation of emotions were the bilateral striate and
extra-striate cortices, primary motor and premotor regions,
limbic structures (amygdala, insula and ventral striatum) and
the cerebellum. Also, they found a bilateral activity within the
pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (Brodmann’s area
44) as well as in the neighboring pars triangularis (Brodmann’s
area 45), with the strongest peaks in the right hemisphere
(Dapretto et al., 2006). This brain region has been identified
with mirror properties in adult human (Buccino et al., 2001),
showing a possible relationship among imitation and mirror
neural networks (Dapretto et al., 2006).
In addition, Saxe et al. (2009) showed that in children between
6 and 11 years, the brain regions involved in perceiving and
reasoning about other people were the bilateral TPJ and the
precuneus. The mPFC was also active but with a lower threshold
than the other brain regions (Saxe et al., 2009). Interestingly,
when they examined the possible change related to age, they
found that only the right TPJ showed a significant correlation
with age, which may reveal a maturational selectivity for social
information. Moreover, they observed that the brain regions that
were involved in theory of mind processing did not overlap with
brain regions devoted to the perception of biological motion. In
fact, they found that the perception of biological motion was
related to the recruitment of right pSTS. This is a remarkable
finding for a full understanding of the social phenomena as a
developmental outcome, because it suggests that theory of mind
comprehension may rely on a distinct and later developed neural
substrate (Saxe et al., 2009).
In summary, cerebral development involves a process of
neural specialization that encompasses different levels that are
related to each other. This chronology is represented in the
Figure 2. All these neural levels show a trajectory characterized
a reduction in the cortical area that are recruited in some activity
(e.g., reduction of extension of activity in fMRI studies or the
amplitude of ERP components), that can reflect an increase in the
local efficacy of social processing. Specifically, this developmental
trajectory is based on a first increment followed by a decrease of
cortical thickness, amplitude, and latency in the ERP, while there
is a concomitant increase in myelination and selectivity activity.
Indeed, the development of brain networks indicates a decrease
or segregation of local connectivity together with an increase
in the connectivity between distant brain regions (Fair et al.,
2009). Thus, the specialization improvement is also evident in a
constant change in the organization of brain networks (Smit et al.,
2012; Betzel et al., 2014; Tymofiyeva et al., 2014) that enables
the development of an efficient processing lifelong. The evidence
reviewed here can shed light on the relationship between brain
maturation and the acquisition of social skills. Although the
evidence in non-human primates and healthy human beings is
remarkable, the study of certain disorders with alterations in
social development like autism can be extremely informative and
useful (Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012) for a better understanding
of the normal developmental trajectory. According to this aim, in
the next section we will briefly discuss some the evidence found
in ASD, in order to shed light on the development of the social
functioning and its neural correlates in these subjects.
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FIGURE 2 | Summary of the neural evidence related to the developmental trajectory of the social brain. Blue indicates changes related to event-related
potential evidence; Red denotes changes associated with the brain activity related to specific social tasks. Continuous line represents the strength in association
between brain activity and social tasks, and dotted line indicates the areas of brain that show significant activity. Yellow represents the change in connectivity and
architecture of the brain networks. Green represents changes in myelination and orange changes in cortical thickness in both sensory-motor areas (dotted lines) and
association areas (continuous lines).
Alterations in the Development of Social
Skills: Lessons from Autism Spectrum
Disorders
ASD are a heterogeneous group of neurodevelopmental disorders
that include symptoms in two main areas: (1) deficit in
social communication and social interaction and (2) restricted,
repetitive patterns of interests, activities, or behavior. These
symptoms only become evident after the third year of
life (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This makes it
necessary to take into account the need to identify early
reliable markers for this disorder, which would also allow earlier
detection and more effective interventions (Gliga et al., 2014).
The neurobiological evidence consistently indicates that ASD
are multifactorial disorders, but unfortunately, their underlying
mechanisms are still unknown (Billeci et al., 2013). Some findings
imply alterations in the signaling pathways of neurotrophic
factors such as BDNF, in dendritic development and synaptic
connections, and in vesicular traffic (Chapleau et al., 2009;
Penzes et al., 2011; Durand et al., 2012). Other reports indicate
differences in the neuroanatomical volumes (Aoki et al., 2012),
in mitochondrial function (Rossignol and Frye, 2012), and some
others imply the involvement of glia (Ahlsén et al., 1993; Vargas
et al., 2005; Aoki et al., 2012).
In addition, the behavioral, electrophysiological, and imaging
evidence in children with ASD have reported abnormalities in
several social processes. These findings include impairments in
the mirror neuron system (Oberman et al., 2005; Dapretto et al.,
2006; Raymaekers et al., 2009), in multisensory processing and
in its link to complex cognitive functions such as speech (Redcay
and Courchesne, 2008; Stevenson et al., 2014), in deficits in face
recognition appearing in 10-month old infants (Gunji et al., 2013;
Luyster et al., 2014), in eye contact (Klin et al., 2002; Pelphrey
et al., 2002; Elsabbagh et al., 2009; Jones and Klin, 2013; Von dem
Hagen et al., 2013), in the ability of JA (Charman et al., 2001;
Charman, 2003; Morgan et al., 2003; Mundy and Jarrold, 2010;
Redcay et al., 2013), in the ability of mentalizing (i.e., the ability
to appreciate the difference between the own knowledge and that
of the others; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Happé, 1995; Charman
et al., 2001), and in playing correlates, i.e., the pretended play
(Wing and Gould, 1979; Ungerer and Sigman, 1981; Charman
et al., 2001).
Furthermore, several reports have described ASD as a
disorder of neural synchrony, which has its origins in functional
connections within and between brain regions usually mediated
by alpha, beta, and theta oscillations (Uhlhaas and Singer, 2006;
Righi et al., 2014). The prevailing hypothesis states that ASD
is characterized by reduced long-range functional connectivity
and increased local functional connectivity (Courchesne and
Pierce, 2005; Righi et al., 2014). Several studies in adults and
children have pointed to a disorder of brain connectivity as being
responsible for abnormal social cognition in ASD, specifically
among the components of the social brain (Stroganova et al.,
2007; Gotts et al., 2012; Rudie et al., 2012). For example,
an abnormal functional coupling between the amygdala and
temporal cortex is shown when processing faces (Kleinhans
et al., 2008), as well as reduced long-range amygdala connectivity
(Rudie et al., 2012). In fact, an interesting study in boys between 3
and 8 years with ASD and typically developing children observed
that boys with ASD showed a higher amount of prefrontal
delta during stillness and in a sustained visual attention task
(Stroganova et al., 2007). They also found an abnormal EEG
power asymmetry over the mid-temporal regions. The authors
claim that this finding could be interpreted as a reduced
neural connectivity in the right temporal cortex which might
explain a decreased capacity of the right temporal cortex to
generate EEG rhythms. An alteration in long-range functional
connectivity has also been demonstrated using fMRI in toddlers
with ASD (Dinstein et al., 2011). Although the reduction in long-
range connectivity can also be reflected in a decrease of the
structural connection between regions (e.g., reduction in corpus
callosum volume), a recent study in large sample does not found
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structural deficit in ASD in corpus callosum (Lefebvre et al.,
2015).
Regarding to mirror neurons functioning in ASD, the EEG
evidence has been contradictory. Oberman et al. (2005) observed
that subjects between 6 and 47 years of age with high-functioning
ASD showed a lack of mu suppression while they observed
a hand movement but not when they performed the action.
Additionally, they found no correlation between age and mu
wave suppression in either group. By contrast, Raymaekers
et al. (2009) observed no significant differences between high-
functioning individuals with ASD and a control group of children
aged 8–13 years. Interestingly, the developmental trajectory of
the mu rhythms present the same negative correlation with age
in ASD and controls, suggesting that local circuit specialization
is spared in this condition (Oberman et al., 2013). Nevertheless,
the previously referred study of Stroganova et al. (2007) in boys
between 3 and 8 years showed differences inmu rhythms between
children with ASD and typically developing children during
stillness and sustained visual attention task. They observed
that the mu rhythm in boys with ASD lacked the leftward
asymmetry present in typically developing children. According
to the authors, this finding may reveal an abnormal lateralization
of sensorimotor function in autism, which might indicate a
decreased dominance of the left hemisphere for motor functions
in children with ASD. Following these contradictory evidences,
in adults with ASD a fMRI study did not find any anomalities in
the mirror neurons system activity to observe other people goal-
direct behaviors (Dinstein et al., 2010). Hence, it is important to
carry outmore studies directly addressed to the evolution of these
activity during the age.
Other social skill that has been reported altered in ASD is face
recognition (Klin et al., 2002; Pelphrey et al., 2002; Gunji et al.,
2013; Luyster et al., 2014). In fact, studies have found evidence of
Nc right lateralization in young children with ASD. In general,
studies have reported two main findings: (1) young children with
ASD did not show a differential Nc response to familiar faces vs.
unfamiliar faces, or (2) this differential Nc response was delayed
relative to typical development. In addition, consistent evidence
has been reported that individuals with ASD have abnormal
responses to the sensory environment (Baruth et al., 2010). These
findings showed that for individuals with autism there may be a
sensory overload that can impair their perceptual and cognitive
functioning, increase their physiological stress, and adversely
affect their social interaction (Baruth et al., 2010). The early visual
components related to face processing, such as P1 and N170,
also present an alteration in ASD children (Baruth et al., 2010;
Hileman et al., 2011). The previously referred study by Hileman
et al. (2011) observed that ASD subjects showed a longer N170
latency than individuals with typical development. Furthermore,
considering the amplitude of these early components, Luyster
et al. (2014) found that in autism high-risk children between 6
and 36 months of age did not evidence a maturational alteration
in P1, having similar mean amplitudes than low-risk children.
However, they observed a wider difference between groups at
later ages. Hileman et al. (2011) also showed that individuals
with ASD do not have differential P1 amplitudes for upright
and inverted faces. While for typically developing individuals
smaller P1 amplitudes were associated with fewer atypical social
behaviors and better social cognitive skills, in ASD subjects,
there were no relations between the ERP components and
atypical social behaviors and social cognition (Hileman et al.,
2011).
Evidence like this could be revealing that these ERP differences
might be reflecting a low specificity of neuronal and cognitive
processes in these children. Indeed, it has been widely reported
in EEG, imaging and magnetoencephalograpic literature, that
subjects with ASD exhibit reduced functional corticocortical
connectivity (Barttfeld et al., 2011; Khan et al., 2013; Nair et al.,
2013; Alcauter et al., 2014; Righi et al., 2014). Taking all this
evidence into account, it is worth noting that the analysis of
social phenomena requires integrative models of the developing
social brain that should include both early and late neuronal and
cognitive processes. In accordance to this integrative perspective,
we will present a blueprint of the main elements that a model of
social functioning should take into account, in order to shed light
to the development of social processes and its possible alteration
in neurological and psychiatric conditions as ASD.
A Specialized Brain. A Model of the
Developing Social Brain
Considering the evidence reviewed here, the establishment of
a cognitive model of development of social functioning should
consider both, a dynamic perspective that takes into account the
temporal dimension and also the constraints imposed by neural
and behavioral evidence. Following the proposal of Johnson
(2011), the developmental changes in neural processes can
represent the specialization of brain functioning to decode social
relevant stimuli in order to adapt behavior to a rich social
environment. Indeed, recent evidence of brain networks indicates
a segregation of local connectivity together with an increase in the
connectivity between distant brain regions during development
(Fair et al., 2009). The increases in brain network organization
(Smit et al., 2012; Betzel et al., 2014; Tymofiyeva et al., 2014)
among more specialized brain regions can thus serve as a
computational basis for the more complex and flexible behaviors,
as demanded by the social environment (Kennedy and Adolphs,
2012; Billeke et al., 2014a). We propose that this specialization
can be understood as a general framework that attempts to reduce
uncertainty of social environment following a kind of Bayesian
inference (Friston, 2010; Koster-Hale and Saxe, 2013). Human
beings live in large groups that increase uncertainty of possible
consequences of controlling and intervening the behavior of
others. In this context, it seems probable that the human
brain comes equipped with “social devices,” which allow us to
read, interpret and finally, to predict other’s behaviors during
development. These devices involve primary genetically encoded
circuits that presumably required the continue interaction with
the environment for their development. We argue that the
ability to predict other’s actions is possible due to these early
onset devices that become more complex and specific through
continued interaction with social environment. This does not
mean that social cognition is only a prediction achievement, but
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the prediction of others’ behavior is the basis for development
of more complex levels of inference (e.g., first and second order
mental state attribution). For example, the behavioral evidence
reviewed here indicates that children can predict behavior of
other people with a false believe (implicit ToM) before being
able to verbally express this prediction or being able to give an
explanation of other’s people behavior (explicit ToM). Indeed, the
first trace of the implicit ToM and social perspective takes place
when children become able to follow a biological motion (see
Figure 1). Thus, these abilities may indicate the first signs of the
ability to make predictions about the social world. These abilities
evolve so that humans easily learn to infer the intention of others
(i.e., building an internal model or internal representation of
other) in order to make more accurately predictions of others’
behavior. Complex mental state attributions could thus represent
a refined mechanism to reduce uncertainty about the social
environment.
The development of an internal model of others could come
precisely from interaction between the different early onset
“devices” recruited primary to identify social agent and the
social environment. As we have described above (see Figures 2,
3), these social devices consist in both sensory and motor
mechanisms. The sensory device (“S” in Figure 3) allows us
to have the early capacity to distinguish the social agent
(e.g., identified eye-like stimulus and other’s movement). On
the other hand, motor devices (“M” in Figure 3) prepare
the infant to interact with a social environment in order to
imitate basic motor behaviors of social agents at an initial stage
and subsequently, to respond and to be able to coordinate
with him/her (e.g., responding joint attention). These devices
progressively specialize by interacting with the surrounding
environment. Evidence of this specialization is the increased
complexity of social behavior from a discrimination of social
agents to the inference of their intentions. For instance, the
ability of infants to discriminate biological motion from non-
biological motion could be the beginning (in time and level of
specificity) of the posterior capacity of discriminating between
an animal and a human, and later the ability to recognize a
familiar/unfamiliar human face. In accordance with this, the EEG
evidence suggested that human face sensitivity may experience
a cortical specialization during childhood (e.g., Haan et al.,
2002; Kuefner et al., 2010) as both amplitude and latency of
ERPs changes during infancy and childhood. Interestingly, the
developmental changes of brain structures (i.e., changes in gray
matter volume, and cortical thickness) can reflect this process of
neural specialization (Mills et al., 2012).
FIGURE 3 | A specialized brain. A model of the developing social brain. Dotted gray line represents the interaction between neural (light green) and behavioral
(orange) development. Note that the gray arrow shows an increase in the complexity of that interaction across ages. Dark green shows the emergence and complexity
of the internal cognitive model of the social agent. Black lines represent the relationship between sensory (blue S) and motor systems (red M).
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We hypothesize that social development depends on a process
of neural specialization in these sensory andmotor devices. These
processes might reveal the development of early onset sensory-
motor devices that might work as tools that increase efficiency in
the interpretation, attribution, and ultimately, prediction of the
behavior of the social agents in order to engage in complex social
interactions (e.g., cooperation, competition, bargaining, etc.).
The development of the internal model of social agents imply
the consolidation of previous experiences and the organization
of those experiences in a complex and flexible way, as well as
the development of other cognitive abilities such as working
memory and language. According to the evidence reviewed here,
the capacity to create an internal model of social agents could
be affected in ASD and may be the basis of the impaired social
interaction that is the core of this disorder. This alteration can
be understood as a specialization disturbance (Courchesne and
Pierce, 2005), as suggested by the evidence indicating a reduced
long-range functional brain connectivity and an increased local
functional brain connectivity in ASD (Courchesne and Pierce,
2005; Happé and Frith, 2006). Moreover, the EEG evidence that
shows alterations in early visual ERPs in ASD (Baruth et al., 2010;
Hileman et al., 2011) may indicate a detour in the trajectory of
the local circuit specialization. Recent findings revealed that ASD
showed impairments in both, automatic neuronal prediction
(Dunn et al., 2008) and ability to manage environmental
uncertainty (Favre et al., 2015). Thus, following the general
framework proposed here, the social alteration in ASD could
be understood as a consequence of both, an impairment to
accurately make prediction of social agents behaviors, and the
ability to adapt their behavior to uncertainty social environments.
Furthermore, the pervasive feature of ASD could be a sign of a
neural alteration that begins at very early stages of development.
However, further studies are necessary to unravel the causal
relationship between neural alterations and social impairments
in developmental disorders such as ASD.
Conclusion
The elaboration of cognitive frameworks of social development
should take into account the temporal perspective of biological
and behavioral changes. In this way, these frameworks can help
to elaborate appropriate educational and clinical approaches.
Thus, further research in pervasive neurodevelopment diseases
such as ASD, should consider integrative approaches, which
include the understanding that social development is a
complex and large unit between the subject and his/her
environment. Hence, we here described the behavioral and
neuronal trajectory of the developmental changes related to
maturation of social skills during the first years of life.
Constrained by these findings, we propose a basic scheme
of a possible cognitive model. This model involves the
development of an internal template of social agents. Such a
process entails the elaboration of efficient prediction of others’
behavior, in order to engage in complex social interactions.
These processes require the specialization of neural networks
to process large amounts of sensory and motor information
existing in social environment, in order to be able to perceive,
to process, to remember and to discriminate information,
with the purpose of predicting and finally understanding
others.
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